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 
Abstract— This paper analyses security problems of modern 
computer systems caused by vulnerabilities in their operating 
systems. Our scrutiny of widely used enterprise operating systems 
focuses on their vulnerabilities by examining the statistical data 
available on how vulnerabilities in these systems are disclosed and 
eliminated, and by assessing their criticality. This is done by using 
statistics from both the National Vulnerabilities database (NVD) 
and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures system (CVE). 
The specific technical areas the paper covers are the quantitative 
assessment of forever-day vulnerabilities, estimation of days-of-
risk, the analysis of the vulnerabilities severity and their 
distributions by attack vector and impact on security properties. 
In addition, the study aims to explore those vulnerabilities that 
have been found across a diverse range of operating systems. This 
leads us to analysing how different intrusion-tolerance 
architectures deploying the operating system diversity impact 
availability, integrity and confidentiality. 
 
Index Terms—security, vulnerability, operating systems, 
vulnerability databases, days-of-risk, forever-day vulnerabilities, 
vulnerability statistics, diversity, intrusion tolerance 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T is of vital significance for system users and developers 
alike that information and communication systems are 
secure. There have been a numbers of occasions recently, such 
as those involving Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center [1], 
San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [2] or British 
NHS [3], which have illustrated how exposed modern society 
is to attacks. The costs of such global cyberattacks as Petya or 
WannaCry could amount to millions of dollars, harm to our 
health and survival and damage to critical infrastructures [4]. It 
is because our communication equipment, computer systems 
and other smart devices suffer from software vulnerabilities that 
cyberattacks, malware intrusions and virus infections have been 
successful. 
In general terms, a vulnerability is understood as a weakness 
that makes it possible for an intruder to damage the information 
assurance in a system. It has been defined as a software fault 
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that a hacker can employ to access to a network or system 
(MITRE Corporation, [5]). There are various ways in which 
vulnerability can be exploited. Attackers can get commands 
executed in the normal way, or overcome restrictions in order 
to gain forbidden access to data, or trigger denial of service and 
system service termination. The primary source of software 
vulnerabilities is weaknesses and faults in software design and 
implementation. Of the 372 updates issued by Microsoft in 
2017 for their operating systems, 228 were security updates for 
eradicating software vulnerabilities [6]. Of these, 137 were 
classified as critical. 
Both operating systems (OSes) and application software can 
contain vulnerabilities, yet it is without doubt security flaws in 
OSes that are most critical since if they are exploited by 
attackers, all services and processes executed by the OS can be 
compromised and illicit access gained to any data that is stored 
on the exposed machine. Moreover, the threats they pose to 
system dependability and security are distinct from failures, 
faults and errors that have been the traditional focus of the 
dependability community’s efforts. 
For instance, in the beginning of May 2017 a global cyber 
attack using ransomware called Wanna Decryptor (also known 
as WanaCrypt0r 2.0, WannaCry or WCry) infected more than 
300000 computers in 150 countries, hitting international shipper 
FedEx, large telecommunications companies in Spain, Portugal 
and Argentina, German railway operator Deutsche Bahn, etc. In 
Britain, the National Health Service (still widely using Windows 
XP OS in their IT systems) was the worst hit. Many UK hospitals 
and surgeries were forced to turn away patients and cancel 
appointments after their IT systems were infected with the 
ransomware. The attack was initiated through exploiting SMB 
vulnerability MS17-010 in Microsoft Windows family of 
operating system.  
This paper builds on a number of studies which examine a 
range of OS security and vulnerability issues [7, 8, 9, 10]. Our 
investigation of some novel aspects of security could yield 
insights that would be significant for not only system 
administrators, security engineers and OS vendors but also 
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ordinary users. It focuses on: 
1) comparing, by using quantitative analysis and statistics, 
the vulnerabilities in a number of OSes that have been identified 
and resolved; 
2) assessing the most significant vulnerability metrics 
including days-of-risk [11], numbers of forever-day [12] 
vulnerabilities and their severity for each operating system. 
This paper expends our early work in [13] in a number of 
ways. First of all, we investigate addition important aspects, such 
as vulnerability distributions by attack vectors and their impact 
on different security properties (availability, confidentiality and 
integrity); a correlation between vulnerability severity and 
vendor’s rapidity to fix them; analysing which types of 
vulnerabilities are the most numerous and severe. In addition, we 
use the reported statistics to examine intrusion-tolerance 
architectures aimed at improving system security using diversity 
of operating system and study how diversity can impact surface 
of attacks targeting different security attributes via common 
vulnerabilities. Lastly, we update our early study by adding 
2017’s vulnerability statistics. 
There have been many works, e.g. [14, 15, 16], studying 
software diversity as a means for tolerating software faults since 
the 70s when the concept of N-version programming [17] and 
Recovery Blocks [18] were introduced. Software diversity has 
been successfully applied in various application domains, 
including railway, aerospace and nuclear power station control 
to improve system reliability.  
One of the most challenging parts of the work on applying 
diversity in practice is the justification of the effectiveness of 
proposed solutions due to the lack of empirical data. The use of 
software diversity for security and intrusion-tolerance was 
proposed in earlier studies reported in [19, 20, 21, 22], which 
clearly showed the needs for demonstrating the applicability of 
the proposed architectural solutions and for evaluating their 
advantages to drive their design.  
Our paper continues a series of works quantitatively studying 
common vulnerabilities of intrusion-tolerance systems 
employing OS diversity, e.g. [23, 24]. In spite of some 
similarities between our work and these studies, there are 
substantial differences. Firstly, Garcia et al. do not consider 
vulnerability statistics in dynamics taking into account a lag 
between the times when a vulnerability is disclosed and when OS 
vendor issue a patch to fix it. Secondly, in our work we analyse 
additional vulnerability metrics related to different OSes: 
average days-of-risk, average number of forever-day 
vulnerabilities, their types and severity. In addition, we examine 
how OS diversity and common vulnerabilities influence the 
attack surface and impact various security attributes of the 
specific intrusion-tolerance architecture. The reported statistics 
will help system administrators and users to make a justified 
decision when facing a challenge of choosing the most secure and 
the least vulnerable operating system and their combinations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section we briefly describe vulnerability databases and studied 
OSes, discuss the most important vulnerability measures (days-
of-risk, forever-day vulnerabilities and their CVSS severity), 
present vulnerabilities discovery and patching statistics, and 
outline the most severe types of vulnerabilities as well as the 
vulnerabilities, discovered in more than one OS. Section III 
examines diverse intrusion-tolerance architectures and 
discusses how diversity of OSes affects various security 
properties: availability, integrity and confidentiality.  
The final part, Section IV, sums up several practical 
conclusions to be drawn from our study. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The main focus of our paper is to consider dynamical aspects 
of vulnerability life cycle. In particular, we study how often new 
vulnerabilities are discovered, how quick vendors issue patches, 
fixing vulnerabilities, and how many of yet unfixed 
vulnerabilities exist in a particular operating system at once. 
With this purpose, our research methodology relies on: 
 --collecting vulnerability statistics from different datasets 
and merging them in a single SQL-like database; 
 --considering the vulnerability life cycle and disclosure 
policies which are used by different vulnerability datasets; 
 --using the Common Platform Enumerations (CPE, 
https://cpe.mitre.org/dictionary/) corresponding to the studied 
OSes to filter vulnerability statistics from the database. 
A. Vulnerability Databases and Datasets 
There are a wide range of actors that are investing plenty of 
effort into discovery and elimination of vulnerabilities, 
including software vendors, international governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, businesses and individuals. 
Many of them make their vulnerability datasets publicly 
available. Among the most reputable of these are: 
 --CVE, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
system, is a list of established vulnerabilities maintained by 
MITRE Inc. (cve.mitre.org). Each vulnerability is assigned a 
unique identifier, CVE-ID, that other vulnerability databases 
use to synchronize their data with CVE and thus make data 
exchange between security databases and products possible. 
Over 18,000 of these identifiers were assigned by MITRE in 
2017 alone. The vulnerability description provided in CVE is, 
however, rather basic and does not include such significant 
details as a comprehensive list of vulnerable products, 
vulnerability type and severity.  
 -- NVD, the National Vulnerability Database maintained 
by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(web.nvd.nist.gov), builds on and is synchronized with CVE. 
Unlike CVE, it categorises vulnerabilities by type and severity, 
provides a specific list of vulnerable software products and 
additional meta-data following the Common Platform 
Enumeration Dictionary (CPE), the Common Weakness 
Enumeration Specification (CWE) and the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). 
 --VNDB, the Vulnerability Notes Database maintained by 
CERT (www.kb.cert.org/vuls/). 
 --VulnDB, a vulnerability database offered as a 
commercial product by the Risk Based Security company 
(www.riskbasedsecurity.com/vulndb/), can track weaknesses in 
third-party libraries. 
 --SecurityTracker, a vulnerability dataset available to buy 
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at securitytracker.com. 
Another common way to inform customers about 
vulnerabilities in software products is vendors publishing 
security bulletins (e.g. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/security/bulletins.aspx). However, the previously widely used 
OSVDB (Open Source Vulnerability Database) and FVDB 
(Frei’s Vulnerability Database) are not accessible any more. 
NVD and CVE, the most comprehensive and reliable 
databases, make vulnerability data available by providing a 
simple search interface on their websites or daily updated XML 
data feeds. It would be difficult, however, to directly use their 
datasets for complex analytics since SQL queries are not 
supported. 
B. Vulnerability Life Cycle and CVE/NVD Disclosure Policies 
There have been several studies focusing on the software 
vulnerability life cycle [25, 26, 11]. In one study [27] its most 
important milestones were defined in order to put forward its 
formal model. The common consensus among security analysts 
and researchers single out 5 major events which make up a 
typical vulnerability life cycle: (i) a vulnerability is created; (ii) 
it is discovered; (iii) it is disclosed; (iv) a patch is created; (v) 
the patch is installed.  
The risks of system exposure for time intervals between these 
events tend to differ. Thus, there is a time of a higher security 
risk from the moment of vulnerability discovery or disclosure 
till the moment when a patch is installed to resolve it, referred 
to as days-of-risk [11]. The terms black, grey and white risk are 
used to refer to varying levels of exposure risk and of public 
awareness of the dangers involved (see Fig. 1). This paper deals 
with grey (post-disclosure) risk associated with the interval 
between the vulnerability being disclosed and the patch to fix it 
being provided.  
The paper takes the date when a vulnerability is assigned a 
CVE-ID in CVE as vulnerability disclosure time. This is 
because CVE-IDs are unique identifiers, whereas most other 
security bulletins and vulnerability databases are seen as 
secondary since their records are synchronized with them.  
While it is sometimes possible to derive the time when a 
patch is produced from vendors’ security bulletins, more 
commonly it is necessary to search vendors’ web sites manually 
in order to extract the relevant information, since typically there 
are no reporting mechanisms or xml-based data feeds that 
would allow automatic search and processing. 
It has been reported [28] that, for about 75% of vulnerability 
descriptions, the median time from the moment when they 
appear in vendor security bulletins till the time when NVD 
makes them available is seven days. This suggests that NIST 
allows time for a patch to be produced to fix the vulnerability 
before publishing the detailed information in NVD, 
implementing what has been called a responsible disclosure 
model [29]. In addition, the median announcement gap varies 
depending on the vendor: it is 2 days for Microsoft, 5 days for 
Oracle and Apple, 10 days for Linus and 12 days for Novell. 
 
Black risk Gray risk White risk
Vulnerability 
discovery
Vulnerability 
disclosure
Patch 
availability
Patch 
installation
time
Days-of-Risk
Window of zero-day 
vulnerabilities attack
Window of forever-day 
vulnerabilities attackVulnerability 
creation  
Fig. 1. Vulnerability lifecycle. 
C. Operating Systems Under Study 
This study examines the vulnerabilities of six widely used 
enterprise operating systems (see Table I). Our reasons for 
choosing these particular OSes and their versions included their 
popularity, the fact that they include both proprietary and open-
source types, belong to different families (Windows, 
Unix/Linux, MacOS), and are sold by different vendors for a 
range of application domains. This prompted us to consider a 
series of studies (e.g. [30, 31, 32]) focusing on the OS market 
share of web servers, where Linux-based OSes predominate, 
and of on-premises server, where various versions of Microsoft 
Windows are most common. 
Our aim was to examine vulnerability data over a significant 
period in order to identify major trends. We also wanted to 
ensure that our conclusions are based on comprehensive 
datasets (in NVD and CVE, there is not enough information on 
the most recent OS versions for statistical analysis). For these 
reasons, the choice of OS versions was made (see Table I) so as 
to focus our scrutiny on the six years between the late 2011 and 
the late 2017, analysing a total of over 2,500 vulnerabilities. 
Even though the OS versions selected have already been 
replaced by more recent ones, our research demonstrates that 
new vulnerabilities are still being discovered in the older OS 
versions. Furthermore, most of these new vulnerabilities can 
also be found in the latest versions of OSes. 
To precisely identify vulnerabilities discovered in a particular 
operating system we use the Common Platform Enumeration 
Dictionary (CPE) [33]. The CPE dictionary, maintained by 
NIST and used by NVD, offers is a structured hierarchical 
naming scheme and a generic syntax for identifying computer 
systems, software, and packages. Each vulnerability record 
stored in NVD has a list of CPE references which allows exact 
identification of all vulnerable products.  
Each CPE reference uses the following general syntax: 
cpe:/type-of-product {o – operating system | a – application 
software | h – hardware/firmware}:manufacturer:product-name 
:release:version:subversion(s):platform{x64|x86}.  
TABLE I.   
OPERATING SYSTEMS UNDER INVESTIGATION 
Operating system 
Release  
date 
Linux kernel 
version 
No of CPE 
references 
Ubuntu Server 12.04 26.04.2012 3.2.x 82 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 10.11.2010 2.6.32.x 87 
Novell Linux SUSE  
  Enterprise Server 11 SP2 
27.02.2012 3.0.13 58 
Microsoft Windows Server  
  2012 R2 
18.10.2012 - 12 
Apple MacOS Server 10.8 25.06.2012 - 7 
Oracle/Sun Solaris 11 09.11.2011 - 9 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY 
 
4 
In practice, several CPE references can match the same 
product (e.g. some of CPEs can refer to the whole family of OSes 
while others can identify the certain OS, version or release). For 
example, the list of CPE references corresponding to Microsoft 
Windows Server 2012 R2 consists of 12 entries including:  
 --cpe:/o:microsoft:windows:::~~~~x64~ 
 --cpe:/o:microsoft:windows:::~~~~x86~ 
 --cpe:/o:microsoft:all_windows:abstract_cpe 
 --cpe:/o:microsoft:all_windows 
 --cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2012:r2::~~~x64~~ 
 --cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2012:-, etc. 
Lists of CPEs for Ubuntu, Red Hat and Novell OSes should 
also be supplemented with CPE entries corresponding to Linux 
kernels used by each of these OSes. Being a part of an operating 
system a Linux kernel, nevertheless, is considered by NVD as 
a separate software product having own vulnerabilities. For 
example, the list of CPEs assigned to Linux kernel 3.2.x used 
by Ubuntu Server 12.04 includes: 
 --cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel 
 --cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:- 
 --cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3.2 
 --cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3.2::~~~~x86~ 
 --cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3.2:rc2 
 --cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3.2.1 
 --cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3.2.1::~~~~x86~, etc. 
In our study, the number of vulnerabilities in Linux kernels 
represents on average 40% of the total number of vulnerabilities 
disclosed during 2012-2017 in Ubuntu, Red Hat and Novell. 
D. Research methodology 
Our research methodology is presented in Fig. 2. It consists of 
seven steps including: 
Step 1: first, we designed and created a MySQL database to 
aggregate information from the CVE and NVD databases.  
Step 2: we developed a software tool which merges together 
XML data files provided by CVE and NVD, and inserted the joint 
data set into the MySQL database. The tool consistently updates 
our MySQL vulnerability database by:  
 --downloading XML data feeds from CVE and inserting 
all new vulnerabilities into the MySQL database, using CVE-
ID as a primary key and the CVE date as a vulnerability 
disclosure time (Step 2.1); 
 --downloading XML data feed from NVD and, if 
necessary, update vulnerability records existed in the MySQL 
database by CVE-ID (Step 2.2). In particular, if NVD reports a 
new vulnerability we set the NVD date as the time when a 
vulnerability is fixed by a vendor and add CVSS, CWE and 
CPE information from NVD in addition to that previously 
imported from CVE.  
Thus, our MySQL database stores both dates associated with 
the same vulnerability: (i) when a vulnerability is first announced 
by CVE and (ii) when its description appears in NVD. This 
allows us to estimate the period of grey risk. We did not exclude 
NVD announcement gaps, discussed at the end of Section II.B, 
during which vulnerability descriptions propagate from vendor’s 
 
1 https://drive.google.com/open?id=1rToATBng3D4vGL7P7bnoxSywsKe0rDdW  
security bulletins to the NVD database. This can result in a 
slightly pessimistic estimate, which, nevertheless, seems to be 
more secure than their underestimate. Because CVE and NVD 
are updated daily, the tool performs steps 2.1 and 2.2 every day. 
By now, our MySQL database includes more than 100000 
vulnerability records. 
Step 3: at this step we selected six popular server operating 
systems which vulnerabilities we wanted to examine. 
Step 4: we used the CPE Dictionary to create 6 lists of CPE 
references corresponding to each operating system. Table I 
reports how many of CPE entries have been associated with 
each operating system (the lists themselves can be downloaded 
from GoogleDrive1). 
Step 5: the CPE lists created at the previous step were used 
to query the MySQL database and select a subset of 
vulnerabilities belonging to certain OSes. 
Step 6: at this stage we run a series of sub-requests to collect 
various vulnerability statistics reported in Section III. 
Step 7: at the final step we studied common OSes 
vulnerabilities (by analysing overlaps of the lists of CPE entries 
assigned to each vulnerability) and investigated how diversity of 
OSes affects system availability, integrity and consistency. 
2.1. Create records by CVE-ID 
(date, description, references)
2.2. Update records by CVE ID
(date, CPE, CVSS, CWE, etc.)
2. Merge 
XML data 
feeds
1. Create MySQL 
database
4. Create CPE lists
CPE
5. Query database
6. Get vulnerability statistics
3. Select OSes
7. Analyse common 
vulnerabilities and 
OS diversity
XML
SQL
 
Fig. 2. Research methodology. 
The accuracy of the results reported in our work fully depends 
on the accuracy of the data, reported by CVE and NVD. As we 
mentioned earlier, CVE and NVD are highly reputable 
vulnerability databases, widely used by many researchers and 
security analysts, that also provide data feeds for the third-party 
security tools (e.g. vulnerability scanners). Moreover, we 
assume that MITRE Inc. and NIST, operating CVE and NVD, 
spend comparatively equal efforts on examining vulnerability 
of different software products and provide trusted information 
that can be used as an indicator of software security/quality. 
III. OSES VULNERABILITY STUDY 
A. Vulnerability Discovery, and Patching Statistics and 
Dynamics 
In this section we summarize the statistics of vulnerabilities 
discovered and fixed in different OSes since the 1st of January 
2012 and until the 31st of December 2017 (see Table II). In the 
table we use the following short names for the operating 
systems under investigation: 
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 --Ubuntu – Ubuntu Server 12.04. 
 --Red Hat – Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6. 
 --Novell – Novell Linux Enterprise Server 11 SP2. 
 --Windows – Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2. 
 --MacOS – Apple MacOS Server 10.8. 
 -- Solaris – Oracle Solaris 11. 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 and Oracle Solaris 11 had been 
released before the observed period (see Table II). Other 
operating systems (Ubuntu Server 12.04, Novell Linux 
Enterprise server 11 SP2, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 
and Apple Macintosh Server 10.8) were released in the 
beginning of 2012. It is worth mentioning that on the date of the 
official release some of those operating systems already had 
vulnerabilities that earlier had been discovered in previous OS 
versions. In particular, Ubuntu Server 12.04 inherited 15 of 
such vulnerabilities, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 – 46, Novell 
Linux Enterprise server 11 SP2 – 26 and Oracle Solaris 11 – 13 
vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities are reported as ‘Inherited’ 
in the Table II. 
During 2012-2017 the largest number of vulnerabilities (1034) 
was disclosed in Ubuntu, the least number (205) – in MacOS. 
The Red Hat and Novell operating systems occupy a middle 
position having 560 and 415 vulnerabilities, respectively. The 
greatest number of vulnerabilities in 2007 (190) were discovered 
in Windows. Cumulative graphs of vulnerabilities disclosed via 
the CVE and NVD databases during 2012-2017 in studied OSes 
are depicted in Fig. 3. One can notice that reporting mechanisms 
are quite different for different OSes. In particular, curves 
depicting the numbers of vulnerabilities discovered in Linux-
based OSes are less discrete having considerably more “small 
steps”. This means that vulnerabilities are reported quite often by 
small portions or even individually. At the same time, 
vulnerabilities in Windows, Solaris and MacOS are usually 
batch-reported only few times a year. 
TABLE II.   
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE STATISTICS 
Y
ea
r 
Vulnerabilities 
U
b
u
n
tu
 
W
in
d
o
w
s 
R
ed
 H
at
 
N
o
v
el
l 
M
ac
O
S
 
S
o
la
ri
s 
Inherited 15 0 46 26 0 13 
2
0
1
2
 Disclosed 64 10 31 32 2 47 
Fixed 32 5 40 36 2 47 
Avg.Sev. 5.21 8.31 5.07 5.13 3.20 4.37 
2
0
1
3
 Disclosed 196 59 71 124 60 31 
Fixed 202 51 86 127 59 32 
Avg.Sev. 5.04 7.12 5.09 4.94 4.92 4.72 
2
0
1
4
 Disclosed 188 64 72 129 40 37 
Fixed 197 38 58 107 40 35 
Avg.Sev. 5.55 6.71 6.79 5.83 7.13 5.08 
2
0
1
5
 Disclosed 251 178 162 52 14 74 
Fixed 223 156 146 80 15 71 
Avg.Sev. 6.06 6.66 5.75 6.67 6.53 5.12 
2
0
1
6
 Disclosed 214 204 125 23 48 4 
Fixed 238 156 16 34 48 17 
Avg.Sev. 5.50 5.93 6.87 7.17 6.78 6.60 
2
0
1
7
 Disclosed 106 190 53 29 41 5 
Fixed 79 234 59 25 24 9 
Avg.Sev. 6.25 4.50 6.05 6.19 4.04 5.18 
T
o
ta
l Disclosed 1034 705 560 415 205 211 
Fixed 971 640 405 409 188 211 
Avg.Sev. 5.60 6.54 5.94 5.99 5.43 5.18 
 
B. Days-of-Grey-Risk Statistics 
The number of disclosed vulnerabilities is often used as the 
major indicator of software insecurity. However, taking into 
account how fast software vendors react on vulnerabilities 
discovered in their products is equally important. To compare 
efforts that different vendors make to solve security issues and 
to deliver security updates fixing vulnerabilities we use the 
Days-of-Risk measure. 
Days-of-risk [11] defines a period of time after a 
vulnerability is discovered/disclosed and until it is eliminated 
from a system after patch installation. It is also known as 
‘window of-vulnerability’ or ‘days-of-recess’. In this study we 
do not take into account possible delays between the times 
when a vendor issues the patch and until a user or a system 
administrator actually installs it.  
Besides, in many cases it is impossible to identify when 
exactly a vulnerability was discovered. In the paper we 
investigate, so called, gray risk or post-disclosure risk which 
defines the interval between vulnerability disclosure time and 
the date when the patch fixing vulnerability becomes available 
[13, 11]. In accordance with our research methodology, 
discussed in Section II.D we estimate days-of-gray-risk 
(DoGR) for a particular vulnerability as the period of time 
between a vulnerability is initially reported in CVE and its 
description appears in NVD.  
Table III shows how the average days-of-risk have been 
changing during 2012-2017 for different operating systems. It also 
includes data reported by other researchers in [7, 10, 9, 34] for 
earlier versions of the studied OSes. For instance, according to [10] 
in 1999 Microsoft spent an average 16 days from vulnerability 
disclosure to issuing a patch. Red Hat spent only 11 days to fix 
vulnerabilities while Sun proved itself to be very slow solving 
security problems in 90 days on average. 
In 2006, as reported in [7, 34], the days-of-gray-risk 
parameter for Microsoft Windows series of operating systems 
(Windows 2000 Professional and Server, Windows XP, 
Windows Server 2003) was estimated at 29 in average. At the 
same time, it took Red Hat 107 days to deliver security updates 
for its Enterprise Linux 2.1, 3.0 and 4.0 while Sun spent 168 
days to do the same for any Solaris version patched in 2006. In 
addition, it was estimated that Apple Mac OS X and Novell 
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server and Desktop (versions 8–10) 
had 46 and 74 days-of-gray-risk respectively. 
TABLE III.   
AVERAGE DAYS-OF-GRAY-RISK STATISTICS 
Year Ubuntu Windows Red Hat Novell MacOS Solaris 
1999* - 16 11 - - 90 
2005** - 24 90 68 55 159 
2006** - 29 107 74 46 168 
2012 144 132 243 109 94 89 
2013 109 131 119 99 113 81 
2014 62 100 108 68 107 69 
2015 79 126 101 133 83 58 
2016 105 183 130 144 138 210 
2017 34 89 80 36 225 49 
*taken from [10]; **taken from [7], [9] and [34]. 
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Fig. 3. Cumulative number of disclosed vulnerabilities. 
 
Fig. 4. Forever-day vulnerabilities. 
 
Fig. 5. Average severity of forever-day vulnerabilities. 
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Table III shows that since 2012 (excepting 2017) there has been 
a general tendency towards shortening the period of grey risk. 
However, during the last two years, the average days-of-grey-risk 
for different operating systems varies significantly between 34 and 
225 days. Unfortunately, it still means that after a vulnerability 
public disclosure users of affected operating system remain 
vulnerable and unprotected against potential hacker attacks during 
months, and the OS vendors are aware of this. 
Our work clearly shows that the conclusion by Jeff Jones 
expressed in a series of his earlier blog posts [7, 11, 35] that 
Windows is the platform exposing users to risks for the shortest 
period of time as compared to other OSes is no longer correct. 
At the same time, we can see that since Oracle took 
ownership of Solaris OS in 2009 the Solaris OS has 
demonstrated the steady reduction of days-of-gray-risks. This 
let us to conclude that Oracle has been reacting on new 
vulnerabilities much faster than Sun did.  
C. Forever-Day Vulnerability Statistics 
The authors of [12] coin a new term ‘forever-day 
vulnerability’ defining a publicly disclosed vulnerability that 
has not been patched yet and can be hacked any time during 
system operation. It is in contrast to ‘zero-day vulnerabilities’ 
[27] which are publically undisclosed vulnerabilities that some 
hackers have already discovered and can exploit. 
Using both, the date of vulnerability disclosure and the date 
when the OS vendor issues a patch to fix it we can plot graphs 
of forever-day vulnerabilities showing how many of known 
(already disclosed publicly) but yet unfixed vulnerabilities 
existed every day during 2012-2017 in a particular operating 
system (see Fig. 4). Any operating system running with forever-
day vulnerabilities is always vulnerable unless the software 
vendor issues a patch and a system administrator installs it. 
Usually, software vulnerabilities are disclosed much faster 
than vendors manage to fix them. This is why a particular 
operating system can contain up to several dozens of forever-day 
vulnerabilities at a time. Any of these vulnerabilities could be 
potentially exploited by hackers to attack the system. Fig. 4 
shows that some operating systems have only few days (if any) 
of vulnerability free operation per year. 
For instance (see Table IV), during 2012–2017 OS Ubuntu, 
Windows, Red Hat and Novell did not have known vulnerability 
free days at all. MacOS had only 111 of such days. It is our hope 
that OS users and administrators understood and accepted the 
potential risk of running these systems. In addition, Table IV 
presents a detailed statistics of forever-day vulnerabilities for 
each operating system during 2012-2017. On average, Ubuntu 
OS had 48 of such vulnerabilities every day. OS Windows and 
Red Hat had 40 forever-day vulnerabilities on average (twice as 
many as Novell). MacOS and Solaris had the least average 
number of forever-day vulnerabilities (13 and 8 respectively). 
D. Vulnerability Severity and CVSS-based Statistics 
Quantitative evaluation of computer systems vulnerability is 
a question of great debates with many approaches proposed  
[36, 37, 38, 39]. It is clear that the more vulnerabilities exist in 
a system, the more that system is prone to hacker attacks. 
TABLE IV.  
FOREVER DAY VULNERABILITIES STATISTICS 
2
0
1
7
 Min 3 2 17 3 2 0 
Max 54 144 33 12 43 9 
Average 17 68 27 6 23 3 
Vuln. free days 0 0 0 0 0 146 
T
o
ta
l 
Min 3 0 13 3 0 0 
Max 137 171 126 61 50 33 
Average 48 40 40 21 13 8 
Vuln. free days 0 0 0 0 111 388 
 
However, one should also account how quick a vendor fixes 
vulnerabilities, how critical vulnerabilities are, how they impact 
on security properties, etc.  
Vulnerability severity is an important characteristic 
quantifying the impact of vulnerability on system security. NVD 
has adopted the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
to assign severity scores to software vulnerabilities [40]. CVSS 
is composed of three metric groups: Base, Temporal and 
Environmental, each consisting of a set of metrics. The CVSS 
Base score represents the intrinsic and fundamental 
characteristics of a vulnerability independently of exploits 
and/or payloads. It is calculated using a group of qualitative 
metrics taking into account: 
 --attack vector (local, adjacent network, network); 
 --access complexity (high, medium or low); 
 --need for authentication (required or not; multiple or single); 
 --vulnerability impact on confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (none, partial or complete); some of vulnerabilities 
impact only one security attribute while others can lead to 
breaches in two or all three of them.  
Temporal and Environmental scores are optional. They 
represent the characteristics of a vulnerability that can change 
over time (e.g. once the exploit code becomes available) and 
among user environments (e.g. whether a vulnerable system is 
exposed publically in the Internet or not).  
In this section we consider only CVSS base scores provided 
by the NVD vulnerability database that are constant over time 
and user environments. Note that the CVSS vulnerability 
severity ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most severe. 
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Fig. 6.  Vulnerabilities distribution by CVSS severity scores. 
The average CVSS vulnerability severity scores (Avg.Sev.) 
for different OSes are presented in Table II.  
We could see, for example, that vulnerabilities in Oracle 
Solaris are the least critical with average severity equal to 5.18. 
The most severe vulnerabilities have been discovered in 
Microsoft Windows (the average severity is 6.54) and Novell 
(the average severity is 5.99). 
Fig. 6 shows the percentage of vulnerabilities with different 
severity levels. Almost a quarter of vulnerabilities discovered 
in Microsoft Windows, MacOS and Red Hat are critical (e.g. 
their CVSS severity scores are in the range [8.0..10.0]). The 
lowest percentage of critical vulnerabilities (less than 12%) was 
observed in Solaris. 
It is worth mentioning that system vulnerability is a 
dynamically changing characteristic. It changes every time 
when a new vulnerability is discovered in a system or when a 
patch fixing one of the previously discovered vulnerability is 
issued by a vendor and applied by a system administrator. 
Thus, system vulnerability at a particular moment of time can 
be estimated as a product of the current number of forever-day-
vulnerabilities (see Fig. 4) and their average severity  
(see Fig. 5).  
As shown in Fig. 5 the severity of vulnerabilities disclosed in 
the Microsoft OS, having the highest value on average, 
nevertheless, tends to gradually decrease in time. In contrast, 
the severity of vulnerabilities in Linux- and Unix-based systems 
is gradually increasing. It is also worth noting that that there is 
no a strong correlation between the numbers of forever-day 
vulnerabilities observed in particular OS and their average 
severity. 
Table V demonstrates vulnerabilities distribution among 
different CVSS criteria: attack vector, need for authentication 
and impact on security properties. 
 
 
TABLE V.   
CVSS-BASED VULNERABILITY STATISTICS 
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Attack 
vector 
Local 6 0 28 19 0 6 
Adj. network 2 0 4 1 0 0 
Network 7 0 14 6 0 7 
Auth. 
Required 1 0 1 1 0 2 
None 14 0 45 25 0 11 
Impact 
Confidentiality 7 0 15 12 0 7 
Integrity 7 0 12 7 0 3 
Availability 12 0 39 20 0 9 
2
0
1
2
 
Attack 
vector 
Local 25 1 14 24 1 26 
Adj. network 4 0 1 4 0 12 
Network 35 9 16 4 1 9 
Auth. 
Required 9 0 3 4 0 7 
None 55 10 28 28 2 40 
Impact 
Confidentiality 35 9 12 20 2 16 
Integrity 25 9 17 13 0 18 
Availability 45 8 24 25 0 39 
2
0
1
3
 
Attack 
vector 
Local 109 31 34 88 27 21 
Adj. network 11 1 3 11 1 0 
Network 76 27 34 25 32 10 
Auth. 
Required 24 2 7 12 3 5 
None 172 57 64 112 57 26 
Impact 
Confidentiality 120 47 48 72 39 7 
Integrity 97 40 42 45 34 11 
Availability 140 51 49 90 31 27 
2
0
1
4
 
Attack 
vector 
Local 81 26 14 72 13 22 
Adj. network 4 4 1 3 0 1 
Network 103 34 57 54 27 14 
Auth. 
Required 11 3 1 15 0 3 
None 177 61 71 114 40 34 
Impact 
Confidentiality 101 52 54 70 40 20 
Integrity 79 44 50 54 35 14 
Availability 144 44 60 106 34 30 
2
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Attack 
vector 
Local 32 105 14 12 9 31 
Adj. network 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Network 219 72 147 39 5 43 
Auth. 
Required 41 4 48 4 0 5 
None 210 174 114 48 14 69 
Impact 
Confidentiality 147 158 95 37 12 31 
Integrity 154 140 90 38 14 34 
Availability 203 136 134 40 12 63 
2
0
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Attack 
vector 
Local 65 85 9 12 9 3 
Adj. network 0 16 1 0 0 0 
Network 149 103 115 11 39 1 
Auth. 
Required 7 27 2 0 0 0 
None 207 177 123 23 48 4 
Impact 
Confidentiality 114 173 98 20 42 4 
Integrity 103 123 94 19 26 4 
Availability 178 134 99 22 35 4 
2
0
1
7
 
Attack 
vector 
Local 21 132 27 19 3 3 
Adj. network 2 0 2 2 1 0 
Network 6 58 24 4 37 2 
Auth. 
Required 0 8 1   1 0 
None 29 182 52 25 40 5 
Impact 
Confidentiality 20 181 37 17 38 1 
Integrity 21 81 37 18 27 3 
Availability 27 87 46 23 29 3 
T
o
ta
l 
Attack 
vector 
Local 339 380 140 246 62 112 
Adj. network 23 22 13 22 2 13 
Network 595 303 407 143 141 86 
Auth. 
Required 93 44 63 36 4 22 
None 864 661 497 375 201 189 
Impact 
Confidentiality 544 620 359 248 173 86 
Integrity 486 437 342 194 136 87 
Availability 749 460 451 326 141 175 
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It shows, for instant, that 75% of vulnerabilities in Red Hat 
OS are network-exploitable; for Ubuntu, MacOS and Solaris a 
percentage of network vulnerabilities is over 50%; the fewest 
percentages of network exploitable vulnerabilities have been 
detected in Windows (46%) and Novell (40%). Ubuntu and Red 
Hat have the highest number of network-exploitable 
vulnerabilities (618 and 420 vulnerabilities correspondingly).  
Practically it means, that it is undesirable to expose Ubuntu 
and Red Hat as web- or e-mail servers publicly available in the 
Internet because of a high chance to be hacked. 
Another information of concern is a significant number of 
vulnerabilities (from 88% to 98% for different OSes) that do 
not require user authentication to be exploited. It means that 
most of hacker attacks would simply bypass built-in OS access 
control mechanisms making them useless. 
Note here that the sum of vulnerabilities within the CVSS 
‘impact’ metric group is higher than the total number of 
disclosed vulnerabilities presented in Table V. This is explained 
by the fact that most of vulnerabilities once exploited would 
allow an attacker to compromise at once all system security 
properties: confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
E. Interdependency Between Vulnerability Severity and 
Days-of-Grey Risk  
Any software users would expect that vendors always try to 
fix the most severe vulnerabilities firstly. On the other hand, a 
rational vendor would take a risk-based view to decide which 
vulnerability to give high priority by taking into account the 
likelihood of exploit.  
A vulnerability may be difficult to exploit (e.g. requires a 
very high competence or simply security controls commonly 
used make an exploit very difficult). Ignoring the likelihood of 
exploits from the vendor’s point of view may be a recipe for 
wasting resources. 
The CVSS base score can be considered as a good risk-based 
indicator as it integrates both vulnerability impact metrics 
(impact on integrity, confidentiality and availability) 
determining vulnerability severity and exploitability metrics 
(attack vector, access complexity and needs for authentication) 
which define the likelihood of exploits 
(https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v2-calculator). 
A set of box-and-whisker diagrams on Fig. 7 shows the 
numbers of days-of-grey-risk corresponding to vulnerabilities 
of different CVSS scores. They allow us to compare how quick 
OS vendors fix the least (CVSS severity score is in the range 
[1.0..3.0]) and the most (CVSS severity score is in the range 
[8.0..10.0]) critical vulnerabilities.  
Unfortunately, it is shown that the days-of-risk metric does 
not actually depend on the CVSS vulnerability severity rating. 
The presented results disprove a widespread hypothesis that 
software vendors put more efforts into fixing the most critical 
vulnerabilities. To some extent it seems to be true for the Red 
Hat operating system. Windows spends approximately the same 
time to fix the most and the least severe vulnerabilities (127 vs 
128 days on average). However, the developers of other OSes 
spend considerably more time on fixing critical vulnerabilities 
as compared to the least severe ones.  
           
(a) Ubuntu                                                                       (b) Novell                                                                     (c) Red Hat 
           
(d) Windows                                                                       (e) MacOS                                                                    (f) Solaris 
Fig. 7.  Box-and-whisker diagrams showing a days-of-gray-risk statistics (Y-axes) for vulnerabilities of different CVSS severity scores (X-axes) 
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F. The Most Critical Types of OS Vulnerabilities  
NVD classifies all vulnerabilities using the Common 
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) scheme. CWE is a formal list 
of software weakness types proposed by MITRE Corporation 
(https://cwe.mitre.org/). 
Our analysis demonstrates that the most numerous types of 
vulnerabilities for operating systems in general are: 
CWE-119 (24%) – Improper restriction of operations within 
the bounds of a memory buffer caused by weaknesses of certain 
programming languages (often C and C++) that do not control 
bounds for the memory buffer that is being addressed. 
Vulnerabilities of the CWE-119 type usually cause arbitrary 
code execution, altering the intended control flow leading to 
accesses to protected information or system crash; 
CWE-264 (23%) – Weaknesses and implementation 
mistakes in permissions, privileges, and access control; 
CWE-200 (15%) – Information intentional or unintentional 
exposure to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have 
access to that information; 
CWE-20 (13%) – Improper input validation which may 
result in altered control flow, arbitrary code execution or illegal 
access to and control of resources; 
CWE-399 (6%) – Improper management of system 
resources, e.g. memory allocation or reallocation; 
CWE-189 (5%) – Numeric errors related to improper 
calculation or conversion of numbers; 
CWE-362 (2%) – Concurrent code execution using shared 
resource with improper synchronization also knows as Race 
Condition; 
CWE-310 (2%) – Cryptographic issues including missing 
encryption of sensitive data or key management errors; 
CWE-94 (1%) – Improper control of code generation also 
known as Code Injection which often happens when software 
allows a user's input to contain code syntax. 
CWE-416 (1%) – the use after free vulnerabilities, which 
result in referencing memory after it has been freed and can 
cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute 
code. 
Analysing both the quantity and CVSS severity scores of 
vulnerabilities of different type (see Fig. 8) we can conclude 
that the most critical ones are: CWE-119, CWE-264 and CWE-
20. CWE-94, despite its small number, has the maximum 
severity on average (8.9). 
Our analysis shows that CWE-119 vulnerabilities, also 
widely known as buffer overflow, still remain the most 
dominating and severe security flaws for all OSes. On the one 
hand, this can be explained by the fact that most of operating 
systems, written in C/C++, are prone to this type of weaknesses. 
On the other hand, it points to the fact that programmers neither 
really pay enough attention to such widely known problem that 
has been around for years nor follow best software development 
practices or make use numerous techniques proposed to cope 
with the buffer overflow issue.  
As a result, vulnerabilities of the CWE-119 type (e.g. CVE-
2016-7277, CVE-2016-4658 or CVE-2016-4598) often allow 
remote attackers to execute arbitrary code, read protected data 
or cause a denial of service. 
 
Fig. 8. The most numerous vulnerability types and their severity. 
Distribution of different types of vulnerabilities for particular 
operating systems can be found in [13].  
G. Common OS Vulnerabilities 
This section examines the vulnerabilities discovered in more 
than one operating systems by analysing CPE entries assigned 
to them. They are usually called common or shared [23, 24]. 
Common vulnerabilities and provide opportunity for 
compromising many or all of OSes at the same time and, being 
exploited, can cause a global epidemic of cyberattacks. They 
exist due to inheriting considerable parts of the OS code from 
its predecessor or reusing common components (system 
libraries, third party software components, OS kernels, etc.). 
The common vulnerabilities are most often discovered in 
different releases of the same OS or in a family of related 
operating systems, e.g. BSD Unix (OpenBSD, FreeBSD, 
NetBSD) or Linux (Red Hat, CentOS, Novell, Ubuntu), etc. 
For example, our analysis shows that 62 out of 63 (98%!) 
vulnerabilities reported by the NVD database in the most recent 
Apple MacOS 10.13 were also found in MacOS 10.8. The 
percentages of vulnerabilities shared between Microsoft 
Windows Server 2012 and its 2016th version is equal to 76% 
(123 vulnerabilities out of 165 ones found in Windows Server 
2016 by the end of December 2017). It is remarkable that this 
number also includes 114 vulnerabilities (69%) that Windows 
Server 2016 shares with Windows Server 2008 and 23 
vulnerabilities (14%) shared with Windows Vista. Moreover, at 
least six vulnerabilities in the SMB protocol, causing this year 
a massive WannaCry cyber attack, are traced to Windows 
Server 2003 and even to Windows XP. 
The 6.x and 7.x (last updated on 01.08.2017) versions of the 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux, and 12.4 and 16.4 (released on 
21.04.2016) versions of Ubuntu Server share up to 75% and 
70% of common vulnerabilities correspondingly. 
It is also worth noting that Oracle Solaris 11.3 in 2016 shared 
29% of vulnerabilities with Oracle Solaris 10.0 and 24% with 
Oracle Linux 7 but none with the 11.0 version, analysed in the 
paper. 
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These results confirm that the developers of operating 
systems reuse significant pieces of code from the previous 
releases without really analysing their vulnerability or 
improving their security. 
Sometimes hackers and security analysts discover 
vulnerabilities that are common for even different OS families. 
One of such vulnerabilities is CVE-2008-4609 found in 
October, 2008. It caused the denial-of-service attack for a 
variety of OSes and their versions, including Linux, BSD Unix, 
Microsoft Windows,  Cisco IOS and possibly many others [41, 
42]. The vulnerability manipulated the state of Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) connections exploiting an algorithmic 
error in protocol implementation in various operating systems. 
A remote attacker was able to cause connection queue 
exhaustion by flags manipulation in the TCP header of crafted 
network packets sent to a victim-computer. 
Fig. 9 shows common vulnerabilities correlated between 
Linux and Unix operating systems during 2012–2017 
(Windows did not share any vulnerabilities with the rest of 
studied OSes). Eighty-five of them were disclosed in all three 
Linux operating systems (Ubuntu, Novell and Red Hat) and ten 
were shared between Red Hat, Ubuntu and Solaris. Besides, 
there were six groups of vulnerabilities shared between 
different OS pairs: Ubuntu and Novell – 245, Red Hat and 
Ubuntu – 60, Novell and Red Hat – 36; Red Hat and MacOS – 
245; Red Hat and Solaris – 4; Ubuntu and Solaris – 5.  
These data emphasize the importance on analysing the 
vulnerabilities of diverse OSes. 
The numbers in brackets correspond to those vulnerabilities 
observed in Linux kernels (the NVD database distinguishes 
between vulnerabilities observed in Linux-based operating 
systems and Linux-kernels). Thus, Fig. 9 clearly demonstrates 
that the largest number of common and group vulnerabilities 
shared between the Ubuntu, Novell and Red Hat OSes are those 
discovered in the Linux kernels (versions 3.2.x, 3.0.x and 
2.6.32) used by them. In total, the percentage of common 
vulnerabilities shared between the three Linux OSes varies 
from 8% (for the 3-version system) to almost 45%  
(for the 2-version systems combining Ubuntu and Novell)! 
It is also noteworthy that the two Unix-like operating 
systems, Solaris and MacOS, do not have common 
vulnerabilities at all while they share certain numbers of 
vulnerabilities with different Linux OSes. 
245
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36 
(14)
85
(59)
Red Hat
378 (31)
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Fig. 9.  Number of individual and common vulnerabilities shared by Linux 
(Ubuntu, Novell and Red Hat) and Unix (MacOS and Solaris) families of OSes. 
The number of vulnerabilities shared by two or more OSes 
can be used as a measure of diversity between them [23]. 
Software diversity [18, 14, 21] has been used as a major fault 
and intrusion-tolerance mechanism to design safety-critical 
computer systems. Thus, choosing the most diverse OSes 
would allow to create the most secure and reliable multi-version 
system. Our empirical study demonstrates that vulnerability 
databases (the NVD database in particular) can help in 
determining the most diverse software products. Our analysis 
also shows that the results reported in [23] should be further 
verified as the authors may not have considered common and 
group vulnerabilities observed in Linux kernels. 
IV. USING OS DIVERSITY TO IMPROVE SYSTEM SECURITY 
AND INTRUSION TOLERANCE 
A. OS Diversity and Intrusion Tolerance Architecture 
Software vulnerabilities represent threats to dependability 
and, in particular, to security, that are additional to faults, errors 
and failures, traditionally dealt with by the dependability 
community [43, 44]. Design diversity is one of the most 
efficient methods for providing software fault-tolerance  
[14, 15] and improving dependability. 
Often, researchers consider vulnerabilities as a special case 
of software faults activated by an attacker [44]. As a result, 
many studies focus on applying diversity to boost the intrusion 
tolerance of a system in the same way as software design 
diversity is used to ensure fault-tolerance.  
In general, the diverse computer system consists of two or 
more replicas that run diverse software. The main assumption 
behind software diversity is that designs and implementations, 
developed independently (programmed by different teams, 
using diverse languages and development methodologies) will 
exhibit failure and vulnerability diversity. 
Diversity, being a part of the intrusion tolerance mechanism, 
can improve system security, especially availability [23, 24, 45, 
46]. However, the impact of software diversity on system 
confidentiality and integrity taking into account common 
vulnerabilities and the dynamic process of vulnerability 
discovery and patching is less understood. 
There has been an increasing number of approaches and 
architectures proposed to build intrusion-tolerance systems. 
They employ different techniques to tolerate intrusions: 
adaptive redundancy and diversiﬁcation principles [47, 48], 
asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocols [49, 50], replica 
“cleansing” [51], etc.  
In our work we consider only one of many possible intrusion-
tolerance architectures coping with vulnerabilities of operating 
systems. This architecture, shown in Fig. 10, comprises 
functionally redundant servers running diverse operating 
systems and a proxy/IDS that mediates client requests to all that 
servers and also verifies their behavior, as described in [45, 47, 
52]. Intrusions are detected through the comparison of the 
server outputs before returning the result to the clients. This 
architecture suits well for tolerating intrusions in synchronous 
replicated server systems, e.g. intrusion-tolerant web servers. 
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Fig. 10.  Intrusion-tolerance architecture under study. 
Operating systems of different families (e.g. Unix, Linux, 
Windows, MacOS) are more diverse, by nature, than those, 
belonging to the same OS family. However, using them for 
building a diverse intrusion-tolerance system usually causes 
various compatibility, portability and synchronization issues. 
This is why developers of diverse intrusion- and fault-tolerance 
systems often opt for using OSes of the same family [53, 54, 
55]. In our study we examine a particular example of the diverse 
intrusion-tolerance architecture comprised of the three Linux-
based OSes (Ubuntu, Novell and Red Hat), which common 
vulnerabilities were studied in Section III.G.  
B. The Threat Model and Assumptions 
In the proposed intrusion-tolerance architecture (Fig. 10) all 
user requests and server responses synchronously pass through 
the proxy. The intrusion detection algorithm assumes that all 
noncompromised servers give the same answer to the same 
request [46, 47].  
Thus, an intrusion is detected when the outputs are different 
due to an exploited vulnerability in one of diverse OSes. 
Majority voting is used then to identify a suspicious replica, 
isolate, cleanse/repair and reinsert it without interrupting a 
service. The general assumptions, which follow from the 
architecture description are: 
--the system is synchronous; it does not need asynchronous 
Byzantine agreement protocols [50]; 
--data and states are replicated in all machines that simplifies 
system implementation; the system integrity and confidentiality 
can be further improved by applying threshold cryptography 
technique [56], however, it is out of the scope of this work ; 
--an attacker cannot directly interact with a certain replica; 
all requests and responses go via the proxy; 
--an attacker has only “one shot” at compromising the whole 
replicated system; a compromised replica, detected by IDS, is 
cleansed before an attacker will get a chance to compromise 
other replica(s) [46]. 
As follows from the above assumptions, if diverse OSes do 
not have common vulnerabilities (i.e. they are 100% diverse), a 
hacker would not be able to compromise all replicas at the same 
time (with the single malicious request). However, as the 
diverse replicas can share a certain number of common 
vulnerabilities, the least vulnerable diverse configuration is one 
with the minimal number of such vulnerabilities.  
In the thread model we take into account the fact that a multi-
version architecture can enlarge the attack surface (i.e. the total 
number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited) and, hence, can 
weaken system confidentiality and, sometimes, integrity [21]. 
Our threat model considers attack surfaces of a replicated 
diverse system for different types of attacks targeting 
availability, integrity and confidentiality in the following ways: 
 --the 3-replicated system preserves availability if at least 
one replica remains available (i.e. 1-out-of-3 replicas returns a 
response); thus, to make the system unavailable an attacker 
needs to target those vulnerabilities, common for all replicas, 
which impact availability (Fig. 11, a); attacking any other 
vulnerabilities would not make the entire diverse system 
unavailable; 
 --the 3-replicated system preserves integrity if 2-out-of-3 
(the quorum) replicas return the correct response; thus, to 
compromise system integrity an attacker needs to target those 
vulnerabilities, common for any two replicas, which impacts 
integrity (Fig. 11, b); 
 --compromising any of diverse OSes would break the 
system confidentiality; thus, an attacker can target any 
vulnerability of any replica, which impact confidentiality  
(Fig. 11, c). 
The attack surface of the 2-replicated diverse system has 
some differences depending on the system implementation  
(see Fig. 12):  
 --if a system is designed/configured to stop its operation 
once it detects data discrepancy (i.e. a fail-stop system [57]), an 
attack compromising integrity of 1-out-of-2 replica would make 
the whole system unavailable; 
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Fig. 11.  Venn diagrams showing atack surface of the 3-version intrusion-
tolerant system. 
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Fig. 12.  Venn diagrams showing atack surface of the 2-version intrusion-
tolerant system. 
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 --if one of the OS versions is considered 
to be more trusted (a master replica), the 
system, when it detects inconsistency, will 
continue its operation using data provided by 
the more trusted master OS; the similar 
approach was used in the HACQIT project 
[52, 58]; in our study we assume that all 2-
version architectures are configured as 
master-slave; OS having less number of 
discovered vulnerabilities is considered as a 
master replica. 
Figs. 11 and 12 quantify attack surfaces of 
different security attributes using the static 
data (the overall number of individual and 
common vulnerabilities discovered in Linux-
based OSes during 2012-2017) reported in 
Section III.G. As expected, the 3-version 
system architecture has the least number of common 
vulnerabilities (85). Among the 2-version systems the least 
vulnerable combination is Red Hat and Novell which has 121 
of such vulnerabilities.  
Ubuntu Server 12.04 and Novell Linux SUSE Enterprise 
Server 11 SP2 use similar versions of Linux core  
(3.2.x and 3.0.x) which explains their similarity in term of a 
number of common vulnerabilities (330). 
C. Examining Static and Dynamic Impact of OS Diversity on 
Availability, Confidentiality and Integrity of the Intrusion-
tolerance System 
In this section we quantitatively examine the vulnerability of 
several possible configurations of the intrusion-tolerance 
architecture, discussed above. As intrusion-tolerance servers 
are usually used to provide critical network services, in this 
section we consider only remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. 
Locally exploitable vulnerabilities identified based on their 
CVSS attack vector (see Section III.D for more details) are 
excluded from the study, as compared to Section III.A. 
Table VI quantifies the network attack surface for individual 
OSes and various configurations of a diverse intrusion tolerant 
system taking into account vulnerability impact on different 
security properties. It clearly shows that developers of 
intrusion-tolerance systems deploying OS diversity have to 
trade-off between different security properties.  
TABLE VI.  
ATTACK SURFACES FOR DIFFERENT SECUROTY PROPERTIES 
IN VARIOUS  DIVERSE CONFICURATIONS 
System 
architecture 
OS No of vulnerabilities 
Ubuntu Novell Red Hat 
avail-
ability 
integrity 
confiden-
tiality 
Single-
version 
*   496 335 336 
 *  145 91 99 
  * 354 267 275 
Multi-
version 
* *  90 91 376 
*  * 77 267 560 
 * * 46 91 329 
* * * 24 99 577 
 
 
Fig. 13 demonstrates the interplay between a number of 
vulnerabilities affecting availability and confidentiality  
(Fig. 13.a), and availability and integrity (Fig. 13.b) for 
individual OSes and diverse configurations.  
If one is ready to sacrifice confidentiality in favour of 
availability the 3-version architecture is the best choice. It 
provides also the best compromise between availability and 
integrity. 
The pair Novell and Red Hat seems to be the best diverse 
configuration for maximising all the properties. It has the least 
number of vulnerabilities targeting integrity and confidentiality 
and also provides a good compromise with availability. 
Among the individual OSes Novell has the least number of 
remotely exploitable vulnerabilities impacting availability, 
integrity and confidentiality. At the same time, Ubuntu should 
not be considered as a good choice in any scenario. 
A more optimal decision regarding the best diverse 
configuration of the intrusion-tolerant system can be made 
dynamically by considering how many common vulnerabilities 
existed each day in a particular configuration (see Figs. 14-16).  
Table VII summarises the statistics shown in Figs. 14-16 and 
provides arguments in favour and against each diverse 
configuration. 
As we expected, the 3-version system significantly reduces a 
surface of network attacks targeting availability down to 1.08 
vulnerabilities per day in average. It maintained the least 
number of forever-day vulnerabilities during the whole six-year 
period, during which 763 were days with no known 
vulnerabilities at all. 
The combination of Novell and Red Hat is the best diverse 
configuration for a system which top priority is availability. On 
average, it maintains 2.04 vulnerabilities per day and ensures 
the same number of vulnerability-free days as the 3-version 
system. 
The 3-version system still remains the best configuration for 
integrity-critical systems. It maintains 5 vulnerabilities per day 
on average. At the same time, the pair Ubuntu and Red Hat 
should not be considered as an appropriate option to build a 
diverse intrusion-tolerance system. 
 
 
  
    (a)                                                                            (b)  
Fig. 13.  Trade-offs between vulnerabilities impacting: a) availability and confidentiality,  
and b) availability and integrity 
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Fig. 14.  Forever-day vulnerabilities in different configurations of a diverse intrusion tolerance system affecting availability. 
 
Fig. 15.  Forever-day vulnerabilities in different configurations of a diverse intrusion tolerance system affecting integrity. 
  
Fig. 16.  Forever-day vulnerabilities in different configurations of a diverse intrusion tolerance system affecting consistency. 
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TABLE VII.   
SUMMARY OF FOREVER-DAY VULNERABILITY STATISTICS  
(ATTACK SURFACE) FOR VARIOUS DIVERSE OS CONFIGURATIONS 
Operating System Diverse system configurations 
Ubuntu * *  * 
Novell *  * * 
Red Hat  * * * 
Availability attack surface 
No of vulnerabilities  
per day 
avg. 5.24 4.26 2.04 1.08 
min 0 0 0 0 
max 15 24 18 6 
No of vulnerability free days 41 83 763 763 
No of days with the least number  
of forever-day vulnerabilities 
521 566 1898 2192 
Integrity attack surface 
No of vulnerabilities  
per day 
avg. 5.31 14.82 5.31 5.01 
min 0 4 0 0 
max 39 83 39 32 
No of vulnerability free days 279 0 279 187 
No of days with the least number  
of forever-day vulnerabilities 
1589 34 1589 1555 
Confidentiality attack surface 
No of vulnerabilities  
per day 
avg. 30.30 43.26 30.24 45.93 
min 9 9 0 9 
max 73 141 104 141 
No of vulnerability free days 47 0 0 0 
No of days with the least number  
of forever-day vulnerabilities 
1587 0 849 0 
Finally, a diverse system, for which the most important 
security property is confidentiality, would benefit from using 
either the combination of Novell and Red Hat, or Ubuntu and 
Novell. The first one had the least average number of forever-
day vulnerabilities per day (30.24) affecting confidentiality, 
however the second one ensured 47 vulnerability-free days and 
maintained the minimal number of forever-day vulnerabilities 
during the longer period (1587 days versus 849 days).  
The 3-version configuration is not recommended for use for 
the confidentiality-critical systems as it significantly enlarges 
an attack surface: up to 46 vulnerabilities per day in average. 
V. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNT 
A significant growth of the total number of vulnerabilities 
discovered in modern OSes as well as the general tendency 
toward increasing their severity demonstrate the serious 
security challenges and risks that OS developers and users face. 
It is very important to understand that the crucial parameters 
affecting system security are not only the total number of 
vulnerabilities disclosed in a particular software product and 
their severity but also, so called, days-of-risk, which show how 
fast software vendors issue patches fixing disclosed 
vulnerabilities, and a number of forever-day vulnerabilities 
defining the attack surface.  
Our analysis shows that the average days-of-risk for the 
studied operating systems varies from 89 days for Ubuntu up to 
130 days for Red Hat. Besides, it found that 28 forever-day 
vulnerabilities on average for the investigated OSes existed 
every day during 2012-2017 (a number of such vulnerabilities 
varies on average between 8 for Solaris and 48 for Ubuntu). 
Thus, our work clearly supports our claim that decreasing 
days-of-risk and reducing a number of forever-day 
vulnerabilities is one of the main challenges in improving 
security of operating systems. 
It is worrying that as our study shows, the rate with which 
OS developers issue security updates in general does not 
depend on vulnerability severity. Average days-of-gray-risk for 
the most critical vulnerabilities remains even 24% higher (!) 
than the one calculated for vulnerability of the lowest severity.  
Another important finding is that developers reuse 
significant pieces of code from the previous releases (which is 
not surprising itself) without really analysing their vulnerability 
and improving their security. Moreover, buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities still remain the most dominant and severe 
security flaws for all OSes despite many techniques being 
proposed to cope with this type of vulnerabilities. 
These our findings demonstrate the worrying shortcomings 
in the engineering practices and policies for developing security 
updates adopted by OS vendors, as well as, in the maintenance 
management processes they run. 
Another specific aspect that the paper studies is the 
vulnerabilities that were discovered in more than one OSes. 
Such vulnerabilities, common for different operating systems 
and even different OS families, can lead to large-scale hacker 
attacks and virus epidemics. 
This calls for application of specially-tailored intrusion-
tolerance techniques. One of them is based on adopting 
software diversity. In the paper we quantitatively analyse how 
operating system diversity impacts attack surface taking into 
account individual and common vulnerabilities. 
Unlike other studies, we investigate how diversity affects 
various security attributes: availability, integrity and 
confidentiality using historical statistics from the CVE and 
NVD vulnerability databases. We confirm that the more OS 
versions we use and the more diverse they are the more the 
system becomes tolerant to attacks targeting its availability. 
However, the diversity can undermine the integrity and 
confidentiality properties by enlarging system attack surface. 
In particular, in our work we considered different possible 
configurations of 2- and 3-version intrusion-tolerance systems 
built by combining Linux-based OSes: Ubuntu, Novell and  
Red Hat. 
Our practical findings based on real vulnerability statistics 
confirm that the 3-version architecture is the best choice to 
ensure high system availability and integrity. On average, it 
maintains only one forever-day vulnerability targeting system 
availability and five ones targeting data integrity. 
Correspondingly, it is 3.6 and 1.7 times less than the average 
results provided by individual OSes. 
However, for the 3-version system the number of forever-day 
vulnerabilities targeting data confidentiality is 3.8 times larger. 
It is fair to note that even the best 2-version configuration 
(Ubuntu+Novell) enlarges the confidentiality attack surface by 
2.1 times. These results show that OS diversity in certain 
scenarios can improve system intrusion-tolerance. Though, it is 
not a panacea for intrusions targeting integrity and, especially, 
confidentiality. This calls for developing more effective 
security mechanisms in addition to the traditional intrusion-
tolerance solutions. 
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